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ABSTRACT 
 
The Genger case, a recently decided case by the Delaware Supreme Court, involves the imposition 
of severe sanctions upon one party who erased unallocated free space on his computer after 
having made his computer available to a court-appointed digital forensics expert who had the 
opportunity to obtain a forensic image of any data on the computer thought to be relevant to the 
case.  The expert did not image unallocated space, which was later erased by Genger’s expert.  If 
the results of this case are adopted as binding precedent in jurisdictions outside of Delaware, 
important implications arise regarding business practices related to electronic discovery.  This 
paper concludes by offering recommendations on how businesses can best deal with the 
requirements set forth by the Delaware court and best practices for electronic discovery. 
 
Keywords:  The Genger Case and the Delaware Supreme Court; Unallocated Space and Electronic Discovery; 
Digital Forensics 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ew legal cases in the United States have had as much of an impact on the electronic discovery 
landscape as did the Zubulake case that led to a major revision in 2006 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure with respect to electronic discovery.  However, the recent Genger case in a Delaware state 
court, where a judge imposed severe sanctions on a party for erasing unallocated or free space from a computer’s 
hard disk after having made his computer available to a court-appointed digital forensics expert for examination, 
may well have as major an impact on electronic discovery practice.  (Genger v. TR Investors, LLC, 2011)  If the 
holding in the Genger case is widely adopted in jurisdictions outside of Delaware, the implications of that case for 
businesses of all types and sizes will have a significant influence on business practices.  While the decision by the 
Delaware Supreme Court is binding only within the State of Delaware, other jurisdictions may very well find the 
holding and reasoning behind the holding persuasive enough to be adopted in those other jurisdictions.  In this paper 
the specifics of the Genger case are examined with respect to electronic discovery and its impact on business 
practices in the event it becomes widely viewed in the United States as a valid precedent that should be followed in 
cases involving similar electronic discovery issues. The specific points of the case’s electronic discovery issues are 
discussed followed by the implications for business should this case be adopted in all United States jurisdictions.  
Finally, the conclusions and recommendations focus on business practices rather than legal issues and offer 
guidance to management on the implications of the Genger case. 
 
THE GENGER CASE 
 
In 2011 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld severe sanctions levied by a Delaware state court trial judge 
against a litigant who intentionally erased data from the unallocated space on his computer and the company server 
after a status quo order had been issued.  Sanctions are punishments that are levied against litigants or their attorneys 
for not following the court orders, particularly when a party has been guilty of spoliation of evidence, that is, when 
that party has destroyed evidence whether intentionally or accidentally.  (Sedona Conference, 2007) If a court finds 
that a party is guilty of spoliation of evidence, then sanctions can vary from fines, attorney fees, costs, adverse-
inference jury instructions or summary judgment. (Brady, 2010)  The destruction in this case was deliberate, but was 
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the destruction knowingly in violation of the status quo order, and more importantly, should it ever be a violation of 
a general status quo order?    
 
Deleted data can generally be recovered using proper forensic technology and knowledgeable forensic 
experts, but in the Genger case the court determined that Genger intentionally cleared the unallocated space with a 
wiping program.  There are numerous relatively inexpensive but very effective wiping programs that can be used to 
erase as much or as little data as the user directs.  In this case Genger was concerned about the possibility that 
fragments of unencrypted deleted data unrelated to the case at hand that might have been left in unallocated space, 
so on the advice of a technical expert, Genger used SecureClean, a wiping program that was used to erase only the 
unallocated space on his hard drive that might have contained file fragments. As soon as the opposing side 
discovered that this had occurred, they asked the court to reopen the settled case and find that Genger had violated 
the court’s status quo order.  
 
At the heart of the issue is whether a status quo order includes unallocated space on a computer without 
specifically mentioning it.  Status quo orders are typically intended to maintain the situation as it is until further 
order of the court, or until the case is resolved.  Normal status quo orders allow companies or individuals to continue 
in their normal business operations but do not allow them to do anything extraordinary.  The pivotal question is 
whether this status quo order included the preservation of unallocated space or must there be a specific order 
including this space as an extraordinary request?  Should future litigants ask for or expect the protection of 
unallocated space to be preserved on a hard drive in response to a status quo order?  How can unallocated or free 
space be protected and is it feasible to do so? The answer to these questions could become the catalyst for drastic 
changes for companies, forensic experts, and lawyers. 
 
Even though courts have not always consistently dealt with the issue of allocated versus unallocated space 
prior to the Genger case, court orders typically did not include the unallocated space without a specific order 
directing otherwise. (Brady, 2010).  Key to resolving this issue is an understanding of what the unallocated space on 
a computer is and what it would encompass to protect that space from deletion. 
 
DIGITAL STORAGE MEDIA UNALLOCATED SPACE 
 
Simply stated, unallocated storage space on a computer’s storage media, such as its hard drive, is space that 
is not currently used for active electronic file storage.  As such, it is considered to be available to other files should 
the need for additional space arise in the event a file is modified or a new file needs storage space.  Unallocated 
space, also known as free space, may possibly contain fragments of old files that have been previously deleted or 
fragments of files and programs temporarily stored in unallocated space by the computer’s operating system.  The 
reason unallocated space may contain file fragments is because when a file is deleted, the data is not erased.  It is 
simply more efficient for the operating system to alter one single bit that indicates whether a given sector of storage 
space is currently in use by an active file or whether it is free for other use.   
 
If a document is opened long enough for the program’s auto-save feature to function, the computer system 
will create a temporary copy of that file in unallocated space. These temporary copies are different from normal 
user-created files, such as word-processing documents, which are stored on the active, or allocated, space of a 
computer where such information is visible to a user. As long as the file is open, a temporary copy is in unallocated 
space. When the file is closed (or deleted by the user), the temporary copy is not deleted.  While information in 
unallocated space is hidden from the view of normal users, it can be recovered with the aid of technology 
consultants making a forensic copy. (Garrie, 2010) 
 
Why would the operating system not completely erase a file when the user deletes it?  Consider the 
following:  If the operating system were to physically erase a file from the hard disk every time a file were deleted, it 
would use computing time and resources to accomplish that task depriving those resources from being used to run 
other active programs.  Those resources would not then be available for the computer to do other productive work.  
The net result would be to severely slow down the processing speed of the computer.  Further, it would complicate 
the “undelete” feature of programs.  To be absolutely certain that all unallocated space were preserved, one must 
create a forensic image of the entire storage medium, which is not only time consuming and expensive, it could be 
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virtually impossible for large organizations with large and complex computer networks.  In addition, for large 
organizations, acquiring such forensic images would necessarily mean that normal business operations would have 
to be suspended to capture those file fragments.  To do so would be no small task, indeed.  Further, it would contrary 
to the normal intent of a court’s status quo order that would not interfere with normal, routine business operations. 
 
RELEVANCE TO THE GENGER CASE 
 
In the Genger case the primary dispute was over control of the Trans-Resources, Inc. (TRI) stock between 
the original owner of the company Arie Genger, (Genger) and new stock purchasers, known as the Trump Group. 
(TR Investors, LLC et. al v Genger, 2009)  Originally the stockholders were Genger, his wife and children.   Genger 
transferred some stock without the permission of the new stockholders, the Trump Group.   The new investors sued 
Genger over the issue of who had the right to make corporate decisions.  The court issued a “status quo” order while 
the case was being litigated.  After the case was settled, Trump’s computer expert discovered that wiping software 
had been used to erase data in the unallocated space of the computer.  As a result of this discovery, Trump moved to 
reopen the case and sought sanctions against Genger for intentionally causing computer “wiping” software to be 
installed and run on his desktop computer as well as Trump’s hard drives destroying information contained in the 
unallocated space of a server and hard drive. (TR Investors, LLC et. al v Genger, 2009) 
 
Genger had started the company over 25 years before but also conducted non-business related activities on 
the company computers.  He often conducted personal and consulting work on the TRI computers and conducted 
company business on his personal laptop.  (Memorandum Opinion TR Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009).   
During the proceedings Genger had expressed concern that there might be stored information on his business 
dealings with the Israeli government and documentation concerning his personal finances and recent divorce.  The 
fact that Genger used the TRI computers for his personal and private business use was in direct violation of the 
policy he set for the company’s computer use. (Memorandum Opinion TR Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009).  
On the other hand, Trump was concerned that Genger might abscond with TRI’s trade secrets.  To accommodate 
both parties’ concerns the court appointed the law firm of Friedman Kaplan to supervise the process of Genger 
removing his personal items from TRI’s office and to review Genger’s electronic files with the purpose of 
identifying documents that were personal to Genger.  Had the Kaplan attorneys found any personal data, Genger was 
allowed to encrypt the information in a manner that would ensure that the documents would be protected and not 
accessible to TRI.  As a practical matter, since the Trump Group had not been permitted access to Genger’s personal 
files, there would be no harm in erasing them as opposed to encrypting them.   
 
For non-personal documents, Kaplan was to preserve those documents for use by TRI in its business and 
make them available for the litigation.  Contrary to acceptable computer forensic practice, Kaplan attorneys opened 
documents and emails to review their contents without regard to the forensic consequences.  A problem with this 
practice is that it is not forensically sound, that is, the very act of opening documents and emails may alter 
information in unallocated space on the computer’s storage media.  The proper forensic standard is to create an 
identical and forensically sound bit stream image of the storage medium and use that image to analyze files and 
emails rather than the original storage medium.  It is essential to work with a forensic image of the storage medium 
in order to guarantee the integrity of the original ESI. 
 
The goal of the Kaplan attorneys was to complete the process during the weekend of September 6 -7 of 
2008 so that the results would be ready for the following Monday meeting between attorneys.  To complete the 
process Kaplan hired an outside technology firm, Kraft and Kennedy, Inc. (K and K) who imaged parts of the 
computer system in order to have a snapshot of everything on the system to date – September 7, 2008.  Kraft and 
Kennedy made a forensic image of the active files stored on the computer’s hard disk but did not create a forensic 
image that included unallocated space.  K and K did not complete the assignment partially because it did not 
understand how TRI maintained computer records or the fact that the company had a server maintained at an outside 
source.  (Genger v. TR Investors, LLC, 2011)  
 
There is no explanation as to why TRI or its attorneys or K and K did not make or request that a forensic 
image of the computers be made.  Further, there is no explanation as to why no one asked for additional time to 
complete the task, or why K and K did not demand a data map indicating all sources of ESI before conducting the 
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forensic search, or acquiring a forensic image of the server’s hard drives as well. There is no evidence that anyone 
had any questions concerning electronic data sources (Luoma & Luoma, 2010) After the Kaplan attorneys and their 
experts had left TRI’s offices with the copies it had made of electronic files, it made no indication that Trump or 
Kaplan intended to conduct additional searches or acquire additional copies after the September 7 date.   
 
Once Kaplan’s attorneys and Trump representatives left, Genger’s forensic expert, Ohana, informed 
Genger that non-encrypted copies of Genger’s personal files might have been created and left on the computer and 
server. He also pointed out that K and K had not made a copy of that unallocated space because they had copied 
only the active file structure.  Ohana recommended that they wipe the unallocated space on both machines 
immediately.  On September 8, 2008 at around 1:00 a.m.  Ohana ran a program called “SecureClean” with the 
“DeepClean option.  As a result of this wiping program, the data contained in unallocated space was effectively 
erased without erasing any active files.  Genger did not mention this action to anyone.  After the case was settled and 
the expert for the Trump Group found that TRI’s computers had the unallocated space erased, they brought  a 
motion to the court asking that the case be reopened and that Genger be sanctioned. (Memorandum Opinion TR 
Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009)  
 
In its decision the court found that Genger did not contact Kaplan, K and K, or even Genger’s own 
attorneys before running SecureClean.  Genger also did not check to see if it was allowed under the status quo order 
or ask the court for permission.  Genger argued he had no intention of destroying evidence relevant to the lawsuit 
but was only trying to remove any possible data left concerning his work with the Israeli Government or his own 
personal data.  On one hand the court stated in its Memorandum and Order that it accepted Genger’s version of the 
facts. (Memorandum Opinion TR Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009)  Yet the court also found that Genger was 
aware that K and K missed a large amount of information and that was the reason it ran SecureClean secretly late at 
night.  (Memorandum Opinion TR Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009) Yet the court did not question why K and 
K only made copies of the active files on the TRI system and failed to image the unallocated space.  K and K could 
have easily made a forensic image of the hard drive if they had been directed to do so or thought it was relevant at 
the time of their search.   
 
The court was very concerned about the data that might have been erased in the unallocated space and 
found that since K and K did not image the unallocated space, it was impossible to know what was erased.  The 
court thought it was significant that when the Kaplan attorneys opened a document long enough for the auto-save 
feature to save a draft of a document, the computer system would have created a copy of the file on Genger’s 
computer in unallocated space.  When the user closed the computer these temporary files would leave a copy of the 
file in the unallocated space of the machine’s hard drive that is invisible to the user.    (Memorandum Opinion TR 
Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009)  
 
Even with the independent consultants’ conclusions the court found that other files besides personal files 
could have been created in the unallocated space prior to the court’s status quo order.  ( Memorandum Opionion TR 
Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 2009) There was no evidence or testimony that there was anything significant or 
unique contained in the unallocated space.  After a two-day hearing, the Court found Genger in contempt because he 
had caused potential evidence to be intentionally destroyed.  The court found that Genger’s actions were 
inappropriate and sanctioned Genger by increasing his burden of proof, requiring him to provide corroborating 
evidence at trial (beyond just his own testimony), requiring him to produce certain documents to the plaintiffs that 
he had claimed were privileged, and awarding attorney fees of $750,000 and fines of 3.2 million. (Genger v. TR 
Investors, LLC, 2011)  This decision was later affirmed in the Delaware Supreme Court. (Genger v. TR Investors, 
LLC, 2011)  By any standards these sanctions are severe. 
 
The court did not lay any responsibility of the failures in this case on the Trump Group officials, their 
attorneys or their experts responsible for the failure to make copies of the unallocated space when they had the 
chance or conducting appropriate discovery.  In this case the actions of Trump, their attorneys, Kaplan attorneys and 
their experts seemed sloppy at best and incompetent at worst.  Before e-forensic discovery should have been 
conducted they should have requested a data map or least questioned the company’s e-forensic expert for data 
sources.  Next they should have decided what information and to what depth did they want to search forensically.  If 
the unallocated space was important to them they should have made a mirror image of the hard drives.   It is 
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interesting that Trump representatives never went back and attempt to do further research or request any additional 
e-discovery.  It was just after the case was resolved that they discovered the action and wanted sanctioned to be 
ordered.  In all other American cases from 2007 to 2011 sanctions are granted because deliberate spoliation occurs 
before or during the discovery process. (Luoma & Luoma, Sanctions or Safeguards: Perspective from 2007 to 2010, 
2010) In the Genger case discovery was already complete with no expectation that further discovery would be 
required.  Serious implications impacting all businesses exist if the Genger case becomes the standard for all 
electronic discovery practice in the future. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion of the Genger case, businesses will be required routinely to go to what 
heretofore has been considered extraordinary means to preserve all unallocated space on company computers in 
addition to the active ESI that now is required for electronic discovery.  Businesses will need to take extra 
precautions to prevent the data from being overwritten.  Prudent business practice would require that the issue of 
unallocated space to be discussed at the earliest opportunity with the opposing side and with the court.  If preserving 
unallocated space would be a severe burden, a motion must be made to the court immediately to clarify the issue and 
to identify who will be responsible for the costs.  For businesses of all sizes the implication is that forensic images of 
all storage media will need to be made no matter how many computers or storage devices are involved.  This will 
always involve a digital forensic expert and substantial costs in expert fees, additional hardware to store the images 
as well as a substantial amount of time to complete the task. 
 
The Genger case will serve as notice to all businesses that they must be prepared for litigation long before 
litigation is anticipated let alone begun.  Further, businesses must have a retention and deletion policy in place in 
order to establish good faith should any ESI be deleted under normal business practice.  Every employee must be 
educated on retention in the case of litigation or even the possibility of litigation.  Data maps must be prepared 
identifying all types and sources of ESI.  A digital forensic expert must be hired long before litigation is anticipated 
to join a litigation team to help establish a litigation plan, educate employees and make recommendations. 
 
Once litigation is commenced a company must retain a digital forensic expert to help prevent inadvertently 
causing an act that could result in the company being subjected to sanctions from the court.  The forensic expert can 
assist in the tasks of finding, preserving and preparing digital evidence. Preserving computer evidence comes first, 
even before evidence is found, because an employee can destroy ESI so easily accidentally or purposely.  
Additionally, as soon as litigation is anticipated the litigation hold must be in place and counsel retained. 
 
Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) and international companies that do business with American companies 
or other common law countries must consider that their organizations must constantly re-examine their electronic 
discovery policies, procedures, and practices, too.  A digital forensic expert must be consulted regularly to be certain 
the company’s policies are current best practices, and attorneys must be consulted to make sure the company is 
keeping current with the rapid change of legal rulings.  Companies must plan to be proactive.  Considerable expense, 
stress, interruption of business and loss of productivity can be prevented or at least minimized if these issues are 
addressed prior to litigation. 
 
As part of the a company’s retention and deletion policy a company must establish a valid business reason 
for periodically erasing unallocated storage space and then establia a policy that states that it routinely periodically 
erases unallocated space on storage devices and not wait until they are covered up in the normal course of business 
if they want to argue to the court that the failure to preserve unallocated space was a well-established company 
policy and not an act to hide data at the time of litigation.  Further, companies must know where they have their ESI 
stored and should have a data map identifying the what, when, where, how and why there ESI is stored. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the opinion of these authors is that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to affirm the trial 
court’s imposition of sanctions against Genger was wrong.  The status quo order did not indicate that the unusual 
practice of preserving unallocated space on Genger’s computers was required.  Virtually all previous cases involving 
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unallocated space required its preservation only if the order specifically included such a provision.  Other courts 
have made it clear that the value of what can be obtained must be weighed against the costs of preserving and 
retrieving such data by applying the principle of proportionality that weighs the value received versus the cost of 
obtaining the information.  The Trump Group in requesting sanctions had the opportunity to secure the evidence but 
did not, and further, did not request it at any time.  The only costs the Trump Group incurred were the costs of 
proving that Genger had erased the unallocated space.  In the authors’ opinion the court should have considered 
shifting the costs involved to the requesting party. 
 
From a forensics point of view, the court’s requirement that unallocated should have been preserved placed 
an impractical and undue burden on Genger.  As discussed above, the only practical way to preserve that 
information would have been to create a forensic image of every storage device attached to Genger’s computers at 
substantial expense in services and additional hardware.  Again, the principle of proportionality would have led to 
the conclusion that this requirement was unwarranted.   
 
The final decision in this case might be unique and not be applied as a valid precedent in other courts in the 
future, but it cannot be dismissed and ignored by businesses determined to engage in electronic discovery best 
practices.  If nothing else, this case stands for the idea that a clear understanding of a court’s status quo order must 
be obtained before taking any action that could potentially be deemed to be a violation of that order.  Additionally, 
prudent business practice requires that businesses implement the recommendations contained above in the event the 
Genger case becomes the canary in the coal mine for future electronic discovery practice. 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Vicki Luoma is an Associate Professor of Business Law in the Department of Accounting and Business Law at 
Minnesota State University in Mankato, Minnesota, and has been a member of the faculty for 8 years.  Dr. Luoma 
teaches courses in computer and technology law, contracts, employment and labor law, and legal environment of 
business.  Before joining MSU she practiced law for over 25 years.  She received her J.D. from Salmon P. Chase 
College of Law at Northern Kentucky University. E-mail:  Vicki.Luoma@mnsu.edu. Corresponding author. 
 
Milton Luoma is an Assistant Professor of Information and Computer Sciences at Metropolitan State University, St. 
Paul, Minnesota, and has been a member of the faculty since 2002.  Dr. Luoma teaches courses in digital evidence 
analysis, electronic discovery, and computer law in the computer forensics program as well as courses in computer 
science.  Before joining the MSU faculty he practiced law for 25 years.  He received his J.D. from William Mitchell 
College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota, M.S. in Computer Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, and M.B.A. 
and M.S. in Engineering at the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio. E-mail:  Milt.Luoma@metrostate.edu 
 
Penny Herickhoff is a Professor of Business Law in the Department of Accounting and Business Law at Minnesota 
State University in Mankato, Minnesota, and has been a member of the faculty for 25 years.   Dr. Herickhoff teaches 
courses in regulatory law, employment law and conflict management. Her primary research areas are technology 
law, regulatory law and conflict management.  Before joining MSU, Professor Herickhoff practiced law for ten 
years with the firm of Farrish, Johnson, Maschka and Hottinger.  Dr. Herickhoff received her J.D. and L.L.M. in 
Taxation from William Mitchell College of Law, St Paul, Minnesota. E-mail:  Penny.Herickhoff@mnsu.edu 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Memorandum Opionion TR Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 3994-VCS (Chancellor 2009 йил 9-
December). 
2. Brady, K. a. (2010). Practitioner Note: Recent Key Delaware Corporate And Commercial Decisions. New 
York University Journal of Law & Business , 421. 
3. Garrie, D. a. (2010 йил October). Legally Correct But Technologically Off the Mark. Northwestern 
University, School of Law , 1. 
4. Genger v. TR Investors, LLC, WL 2802832 (Del 2011 йил 18-July). 
5. Luoma, M., & Luoma, V. (2010). Data Maps and Rule 26 (f). 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – July 2012 Volume 10, Number 7 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ 449 
6. Luoma, M., & Luoma, V. (2010). Sanctions or Safeguards: Perspective from 2007 to 2010. Southern 
Academy of Legal Studies in Business (pp. 23-8). San Antonio: SALSB. 
7. Memorandum Opinion TR Investors, LLC, et al. v Genger, 3994-VCS (Chancellor 2009 йил 9-December). 
8. Sedona Conference. (2007). The Sedona Principles: Second Edition Best Practices Recommendations and 
Addressing Electronic Document Production. Sedona: Sedona Conference. 
9. TR Investors, LLC et. al v Genger, WL4696062 (C.A. 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – July 2012 Volume 10, Number 7 
450 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ © 2012 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
